

# **Global Investor Day**


## **Global Equities**

May 2022

www.oldfieldpartners.com

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


Value versus Growth <sup>1</sup>

'Value' has a long history of outperformance

Source: 1. Two Centuries Investments October 2020. US equity market data.


## Value investing - time for 'regime change'



## The opportunity in 'Value' is as great as at any time in our history

Source: 1. Bloomberg MSCI World Value/ MSCI World Growth to end March 2022. Source: 2. Two Centuries Investments October 2020.

## Value investing – periods of Value outperformance have been scarce




### Value versus Growth from 2015<sup>1</sup>

### Each time 'Value' outperforms OP delivers

Note: 1) , MSCI World Value/ MSCI World Growth to end March 2022. 2) Vax-May 2021 is 6<sup>th</sup> Nov 20 – 18<sup>th</sup> May 21. Source: Bloomberg.

## Value investing – the vast majority of mangers underperform Value




There are few authentic Value investors left

### Shiller PE Ratio for the S&P 500



## The valuation of the US market has rarely been higher


Source: Robert Shiller, Yale University. Date: As at 9<sup>th</sup> May 2022.



## Value is found outside of the US market

Source: Gavekal, 1st December 2021.


## Not just the FANGs



### **US never this expensive vs ROW**

#### International: Price-to-earnings discount vs. U.S.

MSCI AC World ex-U.S. vs. S&P 500 Indices, next 12 months




Source: FactSet, MSCI, Standard & Poor's, J.P. Morgan Asset Management. Guide to the Markets – U.S. Data are as of March 31, 2022.

## Benchmark risk forces investors into the US


Source: www.longtermtrends.com, Oldfield Partners. Date: As at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022.

## Global Equity Strategy - portfolio structure

### **Sector weights**



### **Country weights**



Global Equity Strategy

## Money printing creates speculation and moral hazard

- Growth stocks
- US stock market at all-time highs
- Retail frenzy
- Loss-making Tech IPOs
- Meme/Reddit stocks
- SPACs
- Crypto
- NFTs

"Contributing to and supporting this euphoria are two further factors little noted in our time or in past times. The first is the extreme brevity of the financial memory. ... The second ... is the specious association of money and intelligence." Galbraith <sup>1</sup>



Andres Guadamuz 🤣 @technollama · Aug 30 Mother and Child by Picasso. \$4.13 million. Punk #7252 \$5.5 million.

We're living in the stupidest timeline.



## Value creates a margin of safety

Chart 12 source: BofA Global Research, 2nd Sep 2021,

Andres Guadamuz via Twitter – Adjusted for inflation, Picasso's initial sale in 1967 of Mother and Child netted \$4.13m at today's prices. 1. John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria.

Valuation **Fundamentals** 20 17.7 18 14.0 20.0% 17.9% 16 18.0% 12.0 15.8% 13.4 16.0% 14 12.3 10.0 14.0% 12 10.8 12.0% 10.8% 10 8.0 9.1 10.0% 8 6.0 6.4 8.0% 6 6.0% 4.0 4 3.2 4.0% 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.0 2 1.2 2.0% 0 0.0% 0.0 Price/earnings Price/cash flow Price/book value Return on equity Net debt to EBITDA MSCI World Value MSCI World OP

Source: OP, Bloomberg.

Date: As at 31st March 2022.

Representative global portfolio used. Based on MSCI method. Net debt/EBITDA excludes financials and includes only industrial net debt where applicable. Earnings, cash flow and ROE based on blended-forward consensus. Book value is historic.

## Strategy performance

US Dollars	Overstone Global Equity Fund	MSCI World	MSCI World Value
YTD 2022	-3.1%	-13.0%	-5.6%
Q1 2022	2.9%	-5.2%	-0.7%
1 year	-4.2%	-3.5%	1.9%
3 years annualised	2.6%	10.4%	6.9%
5 years annualised	3.5%	10.2%	6.7%
Since inception annualised*	5.3%	7.5%	5.9%

Performance shown is of the A shares, calculated on a Total Return basis net of investment management fees and expenses.

Index is MSCI World (Net Dividends Reinvested) and MSCI World Value (Net Dividends Reinvested).

Source: OP, Bloomberg, Northern Trust Ireland and MSCI ©. Data as at 30th April 2022.

\*Inception Date is 1<sup>st</sup> June 2005.

Please refer to the Strategies section of our website (https://www.oldfieldpartners.com) for 5 year fund performance information covering complete 12 month periods.

Y	Т	D
2	02	22

Top 5 Contributors		Top 5 Detractors	
MHI NOV Bayer Barrick Gold Berkshire Hathaway	+2.0 +1.6 +1.3 +0.9 +0.9	Siemens SS&C Technologies Citigroup Exor Samsung Electronics	-1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3

	Top 5 Contributors		Top 5 Detractors	
	Nokia	+1.6	MHI	-1.9
0004	Eni	+0.6	EasyJet	-1.8
2021	Lloyds	+0.4	Samsung Electronics	-1.6
	Hewlett Packard Enterprise	+0.4	Alibaba	-1.5
	E.ON	+0.4	Bayer	-1.4

Source: OP, Bloomberg and MSCI ©.

Date: As at 30<sup>th</sup> April 2022.

% = the contribution to relative return of a representative global equities portfolio versus the MSCI World (Net Dividends Reinvested) Index in USD terms.

## MHI – self inflicted pain then COVID

### OP attracted to stocks under a cloud


- Gas turbine market fell to 30 year low
- MRJ (regional jet) project \$10bn value destruction
- COVID market value falls to \$8bn (\$18bn 2015)

### **Store of Value**

- Current market value <\$12bn</li>
- Headline metrics 12x P/E, 1.0x P/B\*
- Current forward multiple 7x EV/EBITDA no re-rating

### **Fundamentals improving**

- Energy (\$14bn): installed base = high margin services
- Air & defence (\$6bn): Boeing, defence
- Industrial: (\$13bn) (forklifts, turbo chargers, plant etc.)
- Net Zero transition hydrogen, ammonia, battery storage, CO2 capture and LNG plants.
- Margin c.5%\*, targeting 7%, EBITDA > \$3.0bn



### **MHI Price to Book vs ROE**

## Recovery driving significant upside (+70% YTD)

Source: Bloomberg, OP Research. Date: As at end April 2022 \* Bloomberg consensus 03/23

## NOV - largest pure play supplier of oilfield equipment

### OP attracted to stocks under a cloud

- Multi-year draw down in energy sector capex
- NOV market value falls from \$34bn '13 to \$5bn '21

### **Store of Value**

- Exceptional management team cost reductions
- No debt time for recovery
- NOV remains largely FCF positive throughout
- Transition to consumables and renewables (offshore wind)
- Implied value = 4x EV/EBITDA vs LT median 10x

### **Fundamentals improving**

- Revenue recovery forecast from \$5.5bn '21 to \$8-9bn\* and beyond (peak sales \$19bn)
- Margin build, +9%, c.\$1.2bn EBITDA
- Sector multi-year recovery underway



### NA Rig Count and NOV share price

"NOV is the enabler of what still is the most important industry in the world, and we stand ready to meet the challenges of the coming upcycle." Clay Williams, NOV CEO 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2022


## Long-term recovery beyond the oil price (+34% YTD)

	Purchases	Sales
Q2 2021	Fresenius	-
Q3 2021	Alibaba, easyJet	Korea Electric Power
Q4 2021	Alibaba, Samsung Electronics	Toyota
Q1 2022	LG Household & Healthcare, Southwest Airlines, Porsche, SS&C Technologies NOV, MHI, easyJet, Fresenius, Citigroup Alibaba, Citigroup, Siemens, Fresenius	Kansai Electric Power, Nokia, E.ON, Toyota, Barrick Gold Eni, HPE, Sanofi, Tesco

Source: OP.

Representative global equities portfolio used. Bold are complete purchases or sales.

## LG Household & Health Care



- Sell-off due to lockdowns in China and travel restrictions.
- Main brand (The History of Whoo) remains strong.
- High-quality business and strong management.
- Attractive valuation (14x earnings) vs peers at ~30x.
- >50% upside driven by revenue and profit recovery.
- Long-term growth in luxury skin care in China.



### **EV and EBITDA in KRW billion**

## China's COVID lockdown provides the opportunity

## Southwest Airlines

"Cash in this environment is an asymmetrical risk. Not enough, that is a huge problem. Too much, we'll pay down debt or we'll buy available assets opportunistically." – Gary Kelly, CEO of Southwest Airlines, 28 April 2020

- US market attractive high concentration and growth
- Low cost operator + exceptional customer service
- Added 18 airports in middle of the pandemic + order book growth at attractive terms
- Only US airline with Investment Grade rating (+30 yrs)
- Consistently profitable (47 years through FY19).
- High teens ROCE historically
- Track record of taking market share (downturns)



### Strong track record


	1990	2000	2010	2019
Daily departures <sup>1</sup>	>960	>2,500	>3,200	>4,000
Market share <sup>2</sup>	5%	12%	21%	22%
Number of cities	33	58	69	101
Number of states <sup>3</sup>	14	29	35	40
Number of countries <sup>3</sup>	1	1	1	11
Fleet <sup>4</sup>	106	344	548	747
ROIC <sup>5</sup>	8%	20%	10%	22.9%


Source: Southwest Airlines

Oil price shock created entry opportunity Initiated position in March 2022 at \$41  $\rightarrow$  c.80% upside at 14.5 P/E


## SS&C – Mission critical software

- Financial services software
- Focused software operator taking share
- History of good capital allocation
- Founder manager Bill Stone
- Fair value \$120 (100% upside) 20x free cash flow





SS&C P/E Multiple (x)



## High recurring revenues at a large discount to the market

### Acquisitions



Source: OP, SS&C, Bloomberg. Data as at 12th May 2022.

### Value factor drawdowns 1825 – 2020<sup>1</sup>

### Two centuries of value drawdowns

Cumulative loss of value factor since most recent peak (%)



\* Value factor is derived from going long cheap stocks and short expensive ones. Source: Two Centuries Investments  $@{\it FT}$ 

- The drawdown in Value had reached had an extreme
- QE and liquidity driven asset markets regime change
- Momentum valuations do not matter
- Peak of exuberance in 2021
- Signs of fundamental turn for Value turn in 2022

## Each and every time Value investing has bounced back strongly

Source: 1.Two Centuries Investments October 2020, 2. Performance 3 months to end January 2021.

## Global Equity Strategy – holdings and valuation methodologies

aluation Target Valuation (Analyst)							
CompanyName	% Portfoli	o Share Price	Primary valuation method	Fair value	Upside	Total return (2 years)	Resp.
BT GROUP PLC	6.6	185	SOTP + EPS	250	35%	44%	SZ
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B	6.1	345	SOTP + look through earnings + P/B	405	17%	17%	JL
SIEMENS AG-REG	5.8	122	P/E	182	50%	57%	CO
BAYER AG-REG	5.5	65	SOTP	71	10%	17%	CO
NOVINC	5.3	19.37	P/E	27.00	39%	41%	HF
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC	5.3	46.31	P/TBV + P/E	73	57%	67%	RG/SZ
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES	4.9	3,924	P/B	4,410	12%	18%	AG
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GRO	4.7	753	P/TBV	847	12%	20%	AG
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD	4.4	69,200	PE + net cash per share	94,592	37%	42%	AF
ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LTD	4.3	114	SOTP	320	181%	181%	SZ
FRESENIUS SE & CO KGAA	4.2	33.04	P/E	60	82%	87%	CO
CITIGROUP INC	4.1	52	P/E + P/TBV	90	74%	83%	RG
SANOFI	3.8	97	P/E	107	11%	18%	SZ/RG
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO	3.8	45.21	P/E	73	62%	63%	CO
LG HOUSEHOLD & HEALTH CARE	3.8	909,000	P/E	1,421,391	56%	59%	JL
TESCO PLC	3.6	275	P/E, P/B, P/CF, EV/EBITDA	299	9%	17%	NW
EASYJET PLC	3.4	539	P/S	1,100	104%	106%	SZ
SS&C TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS	3.4	74	P/E	120	62%	64%	SZ
EXOR NV	3.2	68	SOTP	110	61%	62%	SZ
PORSCHE AUTOMOBIL HLDG-PRF	3.0	87	SOTP	109	25%	34%	CO
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE	2.9	15.80	P/E + FCF	18.00	14%	20%	NW
ENI SPA	2.8	13.51	Dividend yield	14.70	9%	22%	NW
NOMURA HOLDINGS INC	2.2	519	P/B	696	34%	43%	JM
Weighted Average Upside					44%	49%	

Source: OP.

Date: As at 5<sup>th</sup> April 2022.

Representative global portfolio used.

## Appendix



### Valuation matters

## Valuations remain in unchartered territory in many cases

Source: Bloomberg, 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022. Wilshire 5000/ US Nominal GDP.

### Value vs Growth Return Decomposition last 5 years


5-year annualised ret	turn attributio	on (Jun-16 to Jun-21)		$\frown$	
	EPS	<u>Dividends</u>	<u>"Sustainable"</u>	<u>P/E</u>	<u>Total</u>
Index	<u>growth</u>	<u>(incl reinvestment)</u>	<u>return</u>	expansion	<u>return</u>
MSCI World Value	6.9%	3.7%	10.6%	0.1%	10.7%
MSCI World Growth	6.8%	2.4%	9.2%	10.7%	19.9%

- Earnings growth same for Value and Growth over the last 5 years
- Value higher yield drives higher "sustainable return"
- P/E expansion for Value 0% vs Growth 11% per annum
- Last 5 years Value derived 0% return from multiple expansion, Growth +66%

## The re-rating of Growth erodes the 'margin of safety'

Source: 1. Oldfield Partners research to end June 2021.

## Value investing offers the highest expected real returns




10 Year Expected Real Returns for Major Asset Classes <sup>1</sup>

The US dominates global indices to an unprecedented degree

Source: 1. Research Affiliates - Did I Miss the Value Turn? September 2021.

## "Show us the money!"


Companies mentioning "Adjusted EBITDA" in their annual report



## Op focuses on 'real earnings'ound outside of the US market

## Global Equity Strategy – carbon reporting

### WACI Scope 1,2&3 contribution\* Carbon Footprint Scope 1,2&3 contribution\*\*



- Portfolio concentration makes portfolio-level trend analysis meaningless 3Q21 vs 2Q21 saw portfolio emissions fall 43% & 20% respectively for Scopes 1&2 and 1,2&3 due to sale of KEPCO and purchase of Alibaba
- Concentrate on Climate-related engagement at company level focussed on each company's goals, reporting and achievements

Source: Bloomberg, MSCI ESG. All data is latest reported company data. No estimates used. \*Scopes 1,2& 3 used apart from National Oilwell Varco, Berkshire Hathaway, Exor, Fresenius and SS&C Technologies which have been excluded as scope 3 is unavailable. Scope 1&2 for these companies is available and can be provided on request. \*\*Carbon footprint calculated using Enterprise Value Including Cash (EVIC) Date: As at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022.



- Company analysis
- External expertise and data (MSCI, ISS)
- Vote on all proxies
- No negative screening
- **OP Stewardship Committee**
- Engagement

## Engagement

- Individual and Collective
- Stock specific
  - Reactive, e.g. Barrick Gold, ENI, Rio Tinto, Tesco

The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change

- Proactive, e.g. Nintendo, Kyocera, HP
- Thematic
  - Board structure and composition
  - Remuneration
  - Cyber security
  - Climate change



OP 2019 'A' rated






OP listed as a signatory to the 2020 UK Stewardship Code in September 2021.





We have a responsibility to be good stewards of our clients' capital

## ESG – examples of engagement over the last twelve months











Index	MSCI World	MSCI World Value	Global Equity Strategy
Тор 10	Apple	Unitedhealth Group	ВТ
	Microsoft	Johnson & Johnson	Berkshire Hathaway
	Amazon	Berkshire Hathaway	Siemens
	Tesla	JPMorgan Chase	Lloyds
	Alphabet A	Procter & Gamble	Bayer
	Alphabet C	Exxon Mobil	NOV Inc
	NVIDIA	Chevron Corp	MHI
	Meta Platforms	Home Depot	Mitsubishi UFJ
	Unitedhealth Group	Bank of America	Samsung Electronics
	Johnson & Johnson	Pfizer	Fresenius
Largest Country	US: 69.0%	US: 68.9%	US: 25.8%
Largest Sector	Information Technology: 22.5%	Financials: 21.6%	Financials: 25.9%
Div Yld (%)	1.8	2.8	2.5
P/E	20.1	15.0	11.5
P/E Fwd	17.7	13.4	10.8
P/BV	3.2	2.1	1.2

## Our portfolio is very different to the indices

Source: OP, Bloomberg, MSCI. Date: as at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022.

## Bayer – Roundup fear creates the opportunity

### OP attracted to stocks under a cloud

- 2018 Monsanto acquisition for \$63bn
- Bayer market value falls
- Roundup liability estimated at c.€16bn now in the the price

### Store of Value


SOP – all comparables for the divisions trade at healthy valuation premiums to **Bayer** 

### **Fundamentals improving**

- Crop Science:crop price inflation c.30% YTD
- Pharma: Pipeline showing promise



### Inflation - Corn price (\$)



## Highly attractive underlying fundamentals

### Sell-off in Bayer's shares

## Porsche SE

 Holding company with one main asset: 53% stake in Volkswagen (VW) ordinary shares

### Porsche SE "as is"

OP following VW since 2015 – est. fair value at 7.5x P/E 2024
 → Porsche SE implied value at €109, incl. 15% HoldCo discount

### **Optionality from IPO of Porsche brand**

- IPO of Porsche brand targeted for Q4 2022
  - > Porsche brand: ~20% of VW's profit, est. 20x P/E
  - > Other auto brands: ~50% of VW's profit, est. 5x P/E
  - FinCo: ~30% of VW's profit, est. 8x P/E (1x P/B)
  - $\rightarrow$  Potential for VW valuation at ~9x P/E post IPO
  - → Porsche SE implied value at €135, incl. 15% HoldCo discount






## Initiated position in March 2022 at €73 → c.50% upside + IPO optionality

#### Source: OP Research 12th April 2022, Bloomberg.

## MUFG – down 25% on unit cost and large opportunity cost – value trap?


- Negative rates NIM pressures, slow to cut costs
  - Net Income ¥1tr 03/15, 30% lower in 03/22
  - ROE decline and de-rating
- Absolute and historically low valuation
  - 0.5x (P/BV) even in GFC low was 0.9x
- Capital (\$84bn market value)
  - □ Equity capital gains (\$25bn)
  - □ Morgan Stanley (\$36bn)
  - □ Equity (\$154bn) 12.8% Tier 1 (target 11%)
- Sources of profit recovery
  - o Income; NIMs, Asian growth, fees
  - Costs: headcount (14%), branches (40%)
  - Expense ratio 65% to 60% (30% opportunity)
- Return of capital buybacks and dividend
- Total return 36% over the last 3 years
- Current target rating 0.6x P/BV → ¥847 (+16% upside) <sup>1</sup> Estimated CET1 ratio reflecting the RWA increase calculated on the finalized Based III reforms basis, include



### Management Targets = 9 - 10% ROE

#### Financial targets

- Continue to make sustained efforts to achieve the targets



## Recovery in return on equity to drive re-rating

Source: OP, as at 31st January 2022. Charts taken from Bloomberg and Company investor presentation.


MUFG Return on Equity and Price to Book

## Samsung Electronics

- Consolidation in DRAM sector
- Technological leadership and scale = cost advantage
- Diversification and industry leading capex = maintains competitive advantage
- Holding since 2011, over 4x return
- Consistent valuation approach
- Potential for significant improvement in shareholder

### returns

DRAM players' 3-year trailing average OPM trend




### Foundry & LSI 3% Smartphones 20% Networks DRAM 9% 42% Displays 9% TVs NAND Flash 4%

13%

Source: Company data, UBS estimates

EBIT by product segments, 2021



Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research


Source: Company, BofA Global Research estimates,


The transformation of an industry and company


Source: OP. as at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2021.

## easyJet - emerging relatively stronger from vaccine recovery

- Many airlines entered crisis with poor balance sheets
- OP stress tests Q2 2020
- Low cost model deemed superior over-time
- Strong balance sheet and young fleet, 70% owned
- First to recover 83% revenue short-haul leisure
- Constrained airports = pricing power
- Cost advantage to grow
- Management incentivised to improve returns







### Long-term industry winner

Source: OP research, Bernstein estimates and analysis, Bloomberg,


### **EV to Invested Capital**

## Alibaba Group - capital flight creates value opportunity


- World's largest online marketplace
  Ad based business model expanding into connected businesses
  Growth opportunities:

  Largest cloud operator in China
  265m users of platforms outside China
  - Video, Logistics and Fintech
- Founders including Jack Ma and Joe Tsai (c.4%), Softbank 18%
- Mid-teens return on capital despite investing heavily through P&L
- PE multiple: 18.5x (median since listing = 29.5x)
- Price to sales 4x (median since listing = 12x)
- Sum of the parts >100% upside






## Take rate across ecommerce market places



## Purchased on a PE of c.12x consensus forecasts for 03/24

Source: Bloomberg, OP research. \*Data as at purchase date, August 2021.

# Performance summary



Supplemental Information – Net dividends re-invested. This performance information is supplemental to the GIPS® compliant presentation and is for reference only. Source: Oldfield Partners, Bloomberg and MSCI ©


Date: As at 30th April 2022. \*- Percentages are cumulative. Relative return is geometric.

Global Equity Strategy = Data shown is of the Oldfield Partners Global Equity Composite (which includes the performance of portfolios transferred from Alta Advisers Ltd. to Oldfield Partners LLP in March 2005) from 2000 onwards. Data from 1997 to 1999 is for one representative portfolio subsequently transferred from Alta Advisers Ltd. and which forms part of the composite in 2000.

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# Bottom-up stock selectors



Stock selection is the key driver of alpha

Source: Intersec. Composite return data shown. All World Value Universe. Date: As at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018.

	Fwd P/E	P/BV	P/CF	P/Sales
OP Global Strategy	10.8	1.2	6.4	1.1
UNITEDHEALTH GRP	23.3	6.1	15.0	1.4
JPMORGAN CHASE	10.8	1.4	8.6	2.7
JOHNSON&JOHNSON	17.4	6.0	14.6	4.8
HOME DEPOT INC	18.9	n/a	13.5	2.1
BERKSHIRE HATH-B	23.9	1.4	n/a	2.3
PROCTER & GAMBLE	27.1	8.7	20.3	4.6
BANK OF AMERICA	10.9	1.2	10.3	3.0
PFIZER INC	6.8	3.0	n/a	2.7
BROADCOM INC	16.1	11.7	14.1	7.2
CISCO SYSTEMS	14.5	5.1	11.6	3.8
ABBVIE INC	10.5	11.8	n/a	4.4
EXXON MOBIL CORP	9.1	2.0	5.9	0.9
ABBOTT LABS	23.2	5.0	16.8	5.1
COCA-COLA CO/THE	25.7	10.6	21.1	6.5
PEPSICO INC	25.3	12.5	17.5	2.8
COMCAST CORP-A	11.4	1.9	6.0	1.5
CHEVRON CORP	10.7	2.1	6.2	1.4
WALMART INC	22.3	5.0	14.7	0.7
VERIZON COMMUNIC	8.6	2.2	5.3	1.4



Would raise the overall valuation metrics of our portfolio



Would lower the overall valuation metrics of our portfolio

# Is the MSCI Value index still value?

Source: MSCI and Bloomberg. Top 20 constituents for the index as at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022. Valuation data as at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022.

# Decomposition of headline portfolio RoE

# Over 60% of the portfolio is generating double digit RoEs

Double digit	Portfolio	Consensus
RoE stocks	Weight	RoE
BT GROUP	6.9%	16.7%
E.ON SE	6.5%	22.2%
SIEMENS	6.2%	15.6%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS	5.4%	13.6%
TESCO	5.3%	12.5%
ENI	4.7%	13.0%
SANOFI	4.7%	14.4%
BAYER	4.4%	21.6%
EXOR	4.1%	16.8%
HP ENTERPRISE	3.5%	13.3%
ALIBABA GROUP	3.5%	15.9%
TOYOTA MOTOR	3.1%	12.5%
ΝΟΚΙΑ ΟΥΙ	2.8%	12.1%
FRESENIUS SE	2.8%	11.1%
Total	64.0%	


### Headline RoE understates the potential for the other 40%

Headling RoE understates	Portfolio	Consensus	
underlying returns	Weight	RoE	OP's normalised assumptions
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY	5.6%	6.3%	High single digit RoE excluding excess cash
EASYJET	3.3%	5.4%	RoE post COVID high teens
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES	2.8%	7.7%	Double digit RoE excluding investment securities
Total	11.7%		

Consensus extrapolating	Portfolio Co	nsensus	
status quo	Weight	RoE	Catalysts for change
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP	5.7%	9.6%	Cost efficiencies & yield curve steepening
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL	4.4%	5.9%	Cost efficiencies & yield curve steepening
NOV	3.5%	2.3%	Oil market recovery
CITIGROUP	3.3%	8.5%	Cost efficiencies & yield curve steepening
BARRICK GOLD	2.6%	8.5%	Dislocation/ inflation expectations
KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER	2.4%	5.1%	Nuclear reactors coming online
NOMURA	2.4%	8.4%	Cost efficiencies & yield curve steepening
Total	24.4%		

We seek investments that are lowly valued both in absolute terms and relative to history. To say a stock trades on a low multiple is meaningless in and of itself. More important is how accurately the price that it can be bought for reflects its intrinsic worth.

Investment universe - focus on global equities with c.\$10 billion+ market cap




Work list – fundamental research Primary data, Valuation, Investment note

- Analyse financial report and accounts
- OP financial and operational model
- Forecasting 2 3 years out
- ESG record and risks
- Triangulation of valuation metrics
- · Segmental analysis > sum of the parts valuation

## Estimate of intrinsic worth

# Portfolio construction



Stable, experienced and collaborative team

# OP investment process - Siemens vs GE in 2018

## **OP** attracted to stocks under a cloud

- Disruption can't rely on reversion own work, forward view
- Price fallen a long way says nothing about value
- Cheap headline metrics importance of triangulation (EV)

# Wary of combining operational and financial leverage

- Balance sheet key driver value leakage
- GE high net debt high risk (factoring, poor CF, liabilities)
- Siemens no industrial debt hidden value (transformed, SOTP)

## Long-term - strategic transformation

- GE 'fire sale' to deleverage = value leakage
- Siemens growth Digital factory and spin outs = value creation


	Annualised return*
Siemens	20.4%
GE	0.3%
MSCI Global Value	9.9%




# SIEMENS

# Fundamental analysis is key to separate true value from the statistically cheap


Source: Bloomberg. Since purchase of Siemens 11th Oct 2018 to 31st December 2021.



Risk management is embedded within the investment process



Without Value Traps the value investing proposition would not exist



#### Global Equity Strategy & MSCI World Annual Performance (US\$ terms)

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Date: As at 31st March 2022.

Global Equity Strategy = Data shown is of the Oldfield Partners Global Equity Composite (which includes the performance of portfolios transferred from Alta Advisers Ltd. to Oldfield Partners LLP in March 2005) from 2000 onwards. Data from 1997 to 1999 is for one representative portfolio subsequently transferred from Alta Advisers Ltd. and which forms part of the composite in 2000.

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# Performance - Global Equity Composite

Oldfield Partners Global Equity Composite 01 January 2000 through 31 March 2022 Reported in US Dollar terms									
Calendar year	Composite gross of fees (%)	Composite net of fees (%)	MSCI World (NDR) (%)	Composite gross 3-Yr St Dev (%)	MSCI World (NDR) 3-Yr St Dev (%)	No. of portfolios in composite	Composite dispersion (%)	Total composite assets (US\$m)*	Total firm assets (US\$m)
2000           2001           2002           2003           2004           2005           2006           2007           2008           2009           2010           2011           2012           2013           2014           2015           2016           2017           2018           2019           2020           2021           2022 to date           3yrs per annum           Syrs per annum           Syrs per annum	gross of nees (%)           12.2%           -6.0%           -13.7%           42.5%           19.5%           15.6%           22.9%           7.7%           -38.3%           26.5%           21.9%           -4.7%           10.1%           24.7%           -4.1%           -5.0%           20.2%           19.9%           -8.9%           17.6%           -5.4%           10.9%           2.4%           5.3%           5.4%           6.9%	12.2% -6.0% -13.7% 42.5% 19.5% 15.1% 22.0% 6.8% -38.8% 25.4% 20.8% -5.5% 9.1% 23.7% 4.9% -5.5% 19.4% 19.1% -9.5% 16.8% -6.0% 10.2% 2.3% 4.7% 4.8% 6.3%	(NDR) (%) -13.2% -16.8% -19.9% 33.1% 14.7% 9.5% 20.1% 9.0% -40.7% 30.0% 11.8% -5.5% 15.8% 26.7% 4.9% -0.9% 7.5% 22.4% -8.7% 27.7% 15.9% 21.8% -5.2% 15.0% 12.4% 5.4%	20.7% 17.9% 13.9% 10.8% 13.8% 14.8% 14.3% 11.2% 11.6% 20.2% 20.4%	20.2% 16.7% 13.5% 10.2% 10.8% 10.9% 10.2% 10.4% 11.1% 18.3% 17.1%	3 3 3 4 6 8 9 8 10 12 12 11 12 12 11 12 12 9 7 7 6 7 6 6 6 6	N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.7% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8% 3.7% 2.3% 3.2% 7.0% 4.1% 1.0% 4.1% 1.0% 4.1% 1.5% 1.9% 1.3% 0.4%	630 352 538 872 1128 1294 1736 1977 1365 2282 2818 2975 3507 4237 3870 3352 3915 3753 2384 3132 2732 2822 2702	662 416 617 1134 1480 1972 2342 2652 1586 2567 3400 4236 5697 6598 5152 4242 4922 5132 3655 4637 3840 3721 3515
Since inception per annum Since inception cumulative	6.9% 345.9%	6.3% 292.1%	5.4% 223.0%						

Inception of composite 1st January 2000.

NDR = Net Dividends Reinvested.

\*Part of the composite AUM may include currency-hedged assets.

The value of all investments and the income from them can go down as well as up; this may be due, in part, to exchange rate fluctuations. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.

#### Disclosures

#### Compliance statement

Oldfield Partners LLP claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Oldfield Partners LLP has been independently verified for the periods 1st January 2001 to 31st December 2020. The verification reports are available upon request. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. Verification does not provide assurance on the accuracy of any specific performance report.

#### Definition of the firm

Oldfield Partners LLP is an independent investment management firm established in December 2004, authorised by the FCA in January 2005, and beginning operations in March 2005. For the purposes of compliance with GIPS, the firm is defined as all assets managed by Oldfield Partners LLP. The firm also includes assets that were previously managed by Alta Advisers Ltd and were subsequently transferred to Oldfield Partners LLP. The historical performance record from Alta Advisers Ltd is linked to the performance of Oldfield Partners LLP.

#### List of composites

A complete list of composite descriptions, pooled fund descriptions for limited distribution pooled funds, and a list of broad distribution pooled funds is available on request.

#### Composite description

The Global Equity Composite includes global portfolios managed for external clients run with the following style: large cap, value focussed, concentrated, index ignorant and anti-short term. There is no minimum account size and the benchmark for this composite is MSCI World Net Dividends Reinvested.

#### Composite creation date

The composite was created when Oldfield Partners achieved GIPS compliance in June 2007.

#### Ex-post standard deviation

The three year annualised standard deviation measures the variability of the composite and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36 months. Standard deviation measures are not required for periods prior to 2011.

#### Fees

Gross of fees performance is calculated gross of investment management fees and, where applicable, net of custodial and administrative fees. Net of fees performance is presented net of actual investment management fees and where we operate as a sub-advisor it also includes the advisor's manager fees. Returns are net of all trading expenses. Investment advisory fees are described in Oldfield Partners LLP's Form ADV Part 2A.

#### Fee schedule

Vehicle	Fee Schedule	Expense ratio
Segregated account	0.75%	N/A
Pooled fund 1	1.25%	1.46%
Pooled fund 2	0.90%	1.25%

#### Historic net/gross returns

Net and gross returns are the same from 2000 to March 2005 as the investment management fees charged on the portfolios during this period were so low as to have an insignificant impact on performance and the decision was taken not to gross up the net returns.

#### Currency of results

The results are presented in US Dollar terms.

#### Exchange rates

Sources of exchange rates and share prices may differ between the benchmark and the individual portfolios contained within the composite.

#### Composite dispersion

Composite dispersion is only calculated if there are more than five accounts included in the composite for the full year. Dispersion is calculated as the highest return achieved for an account included in the composite minus the lowest return achieved for an account included in the composite. The calculation uses the gross of fees annual returns.

#### Leverage/Derivatives

From time to time portfolios may use Currency Forwards to hedge currency.

#### Withholding and capital gains taxes

Performance is calculated net of all non-recoverable withholding taxes and where applicable, net of capital gains taxes.

#### Additional information

Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

#### Disclaimer

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# The value of all investments and the income from them can go down as well as up; this may be due, in part, to exchange rate fluctuations. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.

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The Overstone Fund PLC (the "Company") is an investment company with variable capital incorporated with limited liability in Ireland and is organised in the form of an umbrella Fund. The Company has been authorised by the Central Bank of Ireland (the "Central Bank") as an investment company pursuant to Part XIII of the Companies Act, 1990. Authorisation of the Company is not an endorsement or guarantee of the Company by the Central Bank. Authorisation of the Company by the Central Bank does not constitute a warranty by the Central Bank as to the creditworthiness or financial standing of the various parties to the scheme and the Central Bank shall not be liable by virtue of that authorisation or by reason of its exercise of the functions conferred on it by legislation in relation to this Company for any default of the Company.

The Company has been authorised by the Central Bank of Ireland as a Qualifying Investor Alternative Investment Fund ("AIF") pursuant to Chapter 2 of the Central Bank's AIF Rulebook. OP has been authorised and regulated by the FCA in the

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The foregoing summary list of risk factors does not purport to be a complete enumeration or explanation of the risks involved in an investment in the Fund. Prospective investors must read the entire Offering Memorandum of the Company and consult with their own legal, tax and financial advisers before deciding to invest in a Fund.

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